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Abstract  
This study of the co-movements of the transaction prices and trading volumes reveal 
that the mean correlation of prices, and trading volumes alike, among different 
housing sub-markets increases during the market boom. After a financial crisis, the 
correlations drop dramatically and stay low. The distribution of the correlations 
changes from skewed to symmetric. All these coincide with the increase in the total 
variance of prices, as well as the share of the idiosyncratic component in the total 
variance after the crisis. These findings are consistent to a family of theories which 
emphasize on “regime switch” in expectation.     
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… In the ruin of all collapsed booms is to be found the work of men who 
bought property at prices they knew perfectly well were fictitious, but 
who were willing to pay such prices simply because they knew that some 
still greater fool could be depended on to take the property off their 
hands and leave them with profit.  
From One Hundred Years of Land Values in Chicago, by Homer Hoyt 
 
… Usually the process starts with a trend that is not yet recognized… The 
trend becomes increasingly dependent on the bias and the bias becomes 
increasingly exaggerated. During this period, both the bias and the trend 
may be repeatedly tested by external shocks. If they survive the tests, they 
emerge strengthened until they become seemingly unshakable…. A point 
comes when the divergence between belief and reality becomes so great 
that the participants' bias comes to be recognized…. Eventually, the loss 
of belief is bound to cause a reversal in the trend…; this trend reversal is 
the crossover point....    When the process is complete, neither the trend 
nor the bias remains the same. The process does not repeat itself. There 
is a regime change.... 
From Soros on Soros: Staying Ahead of the Curve, by George Soros 
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1. Introduction 
 
Financial crises, and the possible negative consequences to the general economy, 
have always been a concern for academic researchers and policy makers alike. The 
cause of a financial crisis, on the other hand, remains controversial. Clearly, 
governmental misconduct and credit market “over-expansion” may constitute a 
significant part of it. Yet the continuous participation of a significant share of the 
population remains a mystery to be resolved. As the quotations from Homer Hoyt and 
George Soros suggest, people may indeed be aware of the apparently “irrational 
component” of the asset pricing during the “boom”, yet participate anyway. After a 
“crash” or a “crisis” in the asset market, however, the people may “change their 
expectations” and hence a “structural change” could occur. Studying the possible 
structural change in the asset market, nonetheless, is not straightforward. Corporations 
may change their management, the focus of their business, the composition of assets 
they hold, or even merge with other firms after a financial crisis, or even during the 
crisis. It makes the comparison across time periods non-trivial.  
This paper suggests that the housing market may provide us some extra 
information on the issue. Notice that housing units are typically indivisible, and 
display relatively less variations over time and hence the comparison before and after 
a crisis may be more manageable. Thus, while the previous efforts typically focus 
whether the real estate market causes a financial crisis, or the impact on the real estate 
market of a financial crisis to the real estate market, this paper rather focuses on 
whether (and how) the co-movements, or more specifically, the price and trading 
volume correlations among different submarkets within the same city change after a 
financial crisis.1  
Clearly, the change in the co-movements among different estates after a financial 
crisis is relevant to several strands of the literature. First, it is related to the pricing of 
real estate.2 It is long recognized that factors such as the reputation of the real estate 
developer and the specific location characteristics tend to change relatively slow. It is 
especially true for residential housing as the school districts and other “local public 
                                                 
1 Clearly, it is beyond the scope of this paper to review this literature. See Quigley (1999, 2001), Leung 
(2004) and the reference therein. 
2 For more details, see Malpezzi (2002), among others.   
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goods” are proved to be an important empirical determinant for housing prices.3 The 
previous literature seems to focus on real estate market in more advanced countries 
where severe economy-wide crises are relatively rare. In contrast, this paper studies a 
real estate market which experienced a dramatic crisis and the co-movements among 
different submarkets potentially change. Since these factors do not change 
proportionally in the crisis, any changes we can measure can be attributed to the other 
factors, such as the wealth effect on housing demand, or some expectation factors.  
This project may also shed light on the discussion on the correlation between 
house price and trading volume. Existing dynamic general equilibrium models of 
housing prices, such as Kan et al (2004), Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006), Leung et al 
(2007), among others, has shown that the co-movements among the property price 
and trading volume at the national or city level are related to the movement of 
economic fundamentals (such as GDP), the collateral constraints, among other factors. 
However, the study on the correlations among house prices of different sub-markets, 
or the correlations among the trading volumes of different sub-markets, are under-
explored. In particular, if the price correlations and trading volume correlations at the 
sub-market level (i.e. within a city) are merely driven by the aggregate shock or 
financial constraints, we would expect that those correlations among sub-markets 
would be roughly constant over time.  If those sub-market co-movements are driven 
by search frictions, as in Leung and Zhang (2011), the change of co-movements 
would likely to be slow, exactly due to the time-consuming process of search and 
bargaining in the decentralized housing market. And even if the situation is 
complicated by the fact the banks may have loan preference on some sub-markets 
over the others, we would still expect those correlations among different real estate 
developments to change slowly over time, as the search-and-matching process takes 
time, and the application-and-approval of loans takes time as well. Thus, by simply 
inspecting the time-pattern of the price and volume correlations among estates would 
shed light on that literature. 
(Table 1 about here) 
There is an emerging literature on the “bounded rationality” nature of investors 
which may shed light on our analysis. For instance, Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) 
find that the investors are influenced by the people around them. Hong, Stein and Yu 
                                                 
3 Again, it is beyond the scope of this paper to review the vast literature. See Weimer and Wolkoff 
(2001), Hanushek and Welch (2006) and the reference therein. 
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(2007) propose a model in which agents use over-simplifying models for forecasting. 
Over time, the discrepancy between the model prediction and the reality reaches a 
certain threshold and the investors would switch to another forecasting model, 
resulting in a “paradigm shift” in investment behavior. While these works focus on the 
stock market, the same logic could also apply to the housing market. In particular, if 
agents switch their housing price forecasting models, it may lead to a change in the 
correlations among housing prices, as in Wang et al (2000). Our empirical studies can 
examine this possibility formally.   
This paper is also related to the “financial contagion” literature. Strictly speaking, 
since this paper studies the interactions among different estates (or, different 
submarkets) within the same city, it is not a situation of “financial contagion,” which 
tends to focus on the situation where one asset (or market) receives an unfavorable 
shock and how other assets (or markets) are affected. The ideas, however, are similar 
and a quick review of that literature may be instructive. Contagion can be defined in 
many ways and the methodology of the empirical analysis is often chosen accordingly 
(Pericoli and Sbracia, 2003; Rigobon, 2003). Accordingly to Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002), contagion is ‘a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to 
one country (or group of countries)’. Thus, many empirical works on contagion focus 
on the change in the correlation in returns after a shock.  
In the context of Hong Kong, it is instructive to consider a real estate 
development (or simply estate) as a submarket.4 The merits of this approach are clear. 
Cities and nations may differ in many different aspects which can account for their 
housing markets to react differently after a crisis. On the contrary, different 
submarkets within a city share many common “background variables” (including the 
geography, the labor market condition, and the public finance, even the political and 
social structure). In this paper, each submarket (or estate) is essentially a collection of 
high-rise apartment buildings sharing many common features. The nature of high-rise 
apartment building also makes it very difficult to “extend” or to “alter” the physical 
                                                 
4 An “estate” in Hong Kong is similar to a “housing development” in the United States. In Hong Kong, 
an estate is usually constituted by several high-rise buildings built by the same developers on a 
particular location, with similar if not identical designs and materials, and managed by the same 
company. This naturally produces a high degree of homogeneity among units which facilitates 
scientific studies. Size of some of the estates can make them form a distinct community.  
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structure, which facilitates the comparison across different time periods.5 In addition, 
since the boundary of an estate is clearly defined legally and geographically, it does 
not require further econometric techniques to identify the different submarkets within 
the city, and allow us to focus on the change of co-movements before and after the 
financial crisis. 
It is instructive to start with the general picture of the Hong Kong housing 
market. Figure 1a displays the official housing price indices of Hong Kong, corrected 
for inflation. The indices are constructed according to the size of the housing units, 
and not necessarily taking the difference in attributes into considerations.6 Dramatic 
movements in the nominal housing prices are observed in this period. The indices 
begin with values slightly under 20 in 1979 and reach their peaks (about 180) in the 
1997 Q4. They then drop to 100 in 1999 Q1, and reach the bottom (about 60) during 
2003, and then increase again. 
Interestingly, the indices move very closely together (with correlations higher 
than 0.9) before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The gaps among the indices, 
however, seem to widen after the 2003 rebound. Later in this paper we will examine 
whether the correlations among different estates, after carefully controlling for 
differences in attributes, also change during the sampling period.  
 
(Figure 1a about here) 
 
Following their insights, this paper also compares the correlations of de-trended 
housing prices (or, returns), as well as the correlations of trading volume among 
different estates. This approach has several merits.  It is “model-free” and non-
parametric, and preserves the features of the original time series. It also provides a 
visualization of the fluctuations of correlation coefficient over time, and the ability to 
apply the time-series econometric techniques in investigating how the sample 
correlations change over time. Specifically, we follow the “rolling regression 
approach” and estimate correlation coefficients among different estates within each 
                                                 
5 In contrast, some detached houses in the United States would allow for significant extension, 
including adding a basement, or building a small house on the backyard, etc., which makes the 
comparison of value across time periods a non-trivial task. 
6 The government officials claim that they do, yet they never fully reveal the details of how those price 
indices are constructed, and whether those methods have changed over time. 
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‘‘moving window.’’7 This enables us to detect changes in the correlation estimates 
which are affected by abnormal events, or the “financial crisis shocks” we attempt to 
identify, given the limiting sample size. It also differentiates our paper from some 
earlier efforts which adopt the “sampling splitting approach”, which rely on the 
researchers to divide the full sample into “crisis” and “non-crisis” sub-samples, and 
then compare the estimated correlation coefficient for each sub-sample.8 
Clearly, there are potentially alternative approaches for this problem. A popular 
candidate for this class of problem is to use the Dynamic Conditional Correlation 
(DCC) model, presented by Engle (2002). However, unlike some applications of DCC 
model in finance or international finance, where there are only a few exchange rates 
with long time series, we have a much larger number of time series (both prices and 
trading volumes from 36 estates) but the relatively short time series (14 years of 
monthly data). In this case, the DCC approach will demand the estimation of several 
hundred parameters, which is almost infeasible, and definitely not desirable for a 
dataset with only 168 periods.  
On the other hand, this dataset is especially suitable to address our research 
questions. All the transaction data considered in this paper come from 36 major 
estates in Hong Kong, which is a balance panel dataset.9 Our full sample contains 
more than 222,000 transactions in 14 years (1992 to 2005), or on average more than 
3,000 transactions in each month. This gives some credibility for the monthly cross-
sectional hedonic pricing regression. The choice of data frequency is important to our 
research question. To search for the timing of sudden change of correlation structure, 
a higher frequency dataset is desirable, or some information may be lost in the time 
aggregation process. In practice, however, housing transactions take time and thus 
                                                 
7 “Rolling regression” has long been used extensively in the economics literature. Among others, see 
Thoma (1994), Foster and Nelson (1996) and the reference therein. 
8 Some authors have reservations on this approach. Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001) have already 
demonstrated the problem of choosing a short crisis period as there will be severe power problems for 
the correlation tests. This also explains why the two standard tests of inter-temporal stability, the 
Jennrich (1970) and Box (1949) statistics, are un-suitable in the contagion literature as crisis period 
usually only involves a few observations. See also Dungey et al (2005), Forbes and Rigobon (2002), 
Solnik, Bourcrelle and Le Fur (1996), among others. 
9 Needless to say, there are new developments in Hong Kong during the sampling period. However, 
they are relatively few in numbers. The supply of new private housing actually decreases over the 
sampling period, especially after the Asian Financial Crisis. Among others, see Leung and Tang (2011) 
for more details. From a theoretical point of view, Leung et al. (2007) show that the class of hedonic 
equation applied to a balance panel can be justified by a dynamic general equilibrium model. 
Introducing the new developments into the sample will create an un-balance panel and that is left for 
future research. 
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daily or weekly frequency may not be wise choices.10 In light of these considerations, 
monthly frequency may be an appropriate compromise. Our balanced panel of estate-
level data also helps us to avoid cross-sectional aggregation bias, as unobserved 
heterogeneity can be better controlled. We also analyze a restricted sample with all the 
estates with primary market sales removed. We find that the results are in fact similar. 
To conserve space, those results are not reported here.11 
Obviously, the desirable features of our dis-aggregate approach come with a 
price. As we have 36 estates (or, real estate developments) in the full sample (and 26 
in the restricted sample), there are more than 600 pair-wise correlations in returns and 
also in trading volume among estates for each “window” (2-year period). We calculate 
all of them and obtain a distribution of (sample) correlations. We then compute the 
mean, the standard deviation and the skewness of the distribution for each “window,” 
and trace their evolutions over time. Interestingly, we find very clear and significant 
change in these moments, with the timing somehow later than the official date of the 
Asian financial crisis (based on the events in the foreign exchange market), 
suggesting a lag in response in the real estate market.12 This change in correlations 
also confirms the causal observation of “a structural change” in the market. One of the 
virtues of the current approach is that it is intuitive and do not rely on any “bubble 
test”, which can be controversial.13  
There are obvious justifications for choosing Hong Kong in this study. First of all, 
the economic institution of Hong Kong is well developed, resulting in a higher 
efficiency level of the bureaucratic system and a lower corruption index.14 Combining 
these with a fixed boundary,15 a stable exchange rate, a simple tax system (no capital 
gains tax in particular), equal treatment for domestic and foreign investors, and no 
control on capital flows, foreign investors can enter the market anytime for arbitrage, 
should there be an under-pricing of real estate.16 In addition, the real estate market of 
                                                 
10 In Hong Kong, most housing transactions can be finished in a month. See Leung, Leong and Chan 
(2002). 
11 The results of restricted sample will be available upon request. 
12 For more discussion on Hong Kong during the Asian financial crisis time, see Kwan, Lui and Cheng  
(2001), Lui, Cheng and Kwan, (2003), among others. 
13 Clearly, the literature is too large to be reviewed here. Among others, see Gurkaynak (2008). 
14 Among others, see Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) for a discussion on why institutions are important. 
15 Due to the many agreements between the British and the Chinese governments, the boundary of 
Hong Kong is legally fixed and cannot expand, even after the turnover to the Chinese government. This 
is in sharp contrast to cities such as the larger L.A. or Houston, where geographical expansion is 
feasible. 
16 The exchange rate between Hong Kong and U.S. dollars has not changed since the mid-1980s. 
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Hong Kong is dominated by high-rise buildings with sufficient density of trading and 
an unusual degree of homogeneity. Other features of our dataset include the following:  
transaction-based rather than appraisal-based, estate-based rather than district-based, 
monthly frequency rather than quarterly, high-rise buildings, which are almost 
impossible to be extended, rather than detached houses. All these contribute to 
minimize the cross-sectional as well as time aggregation bias.17  
Figure 1b plots monthly real residential property prices in the period 1992 M1-
2005 M12. In these 14 years, there are a number of events that may be important in 
determining the value of residential housings, including the political uncertainty that 
given rise by arguments before the change of sovereignty in 1996, Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997/98, the global technology (dot-com) stock meltdown in 2000, and 
outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in early 2003. It is 
not clear, however, whether the correlations among different estates should change 
with the aggregate housing price. Thus, this paper will test (1) does the correlation 
structure of housing price among residential estates display an asymmetric pattern 
over the cycle? And (2) Does the correlation structure of trading volume demonstrate 
a similar pattern as the real housing return?18  
 
(Figure 1b about here) 
 
The organization of this paper is as follows. The next section will provide a 
description of the data and the methodology. The results will be presented after that. 
The final section concludes and some technical details are reserved in the appendices. 
2. Data Description 
 
This section describes the data source, housing price variable and trading volume 
variables used in the proposed research. The dataset we are going to employ is 
provided by the Economic Property Research Center (EPRC), a subsidiary of the 
Hong Kong Economics Times. The EPRC purchased the data files from the Land 
                                                 
17 For a discussion of the time aggregation bias, see Christiano and Eichenbaum (1987), Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Marhall (1991). For a discussion of the cross-sectional aggregation bias, see 
Hanushek, Rivkin and Taylor (1996), among others. 
18 Leung, Lau and Leong (2002) also study the residential estates in Hong Kong and find that most 
estates display positively significant correlations among the detrended prices and corresponding trading 
volumes. An earlier version of this paper also explores whether the correlation structure demonstrates 
any contemporaneous segmentation of the residential property market. In other words, are there any 
substantial differences between within-group and inter-group correlations? The answer is negative, 
which seems to justify our current approach of investigation. The results are available upon request. 
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Registry Department of the Hong Kong Government and reorganized them in more 
readable format. Our sampling period starts from January 1992 and ends with 
December 2005, which is the longest time series available to us. This research focuses 
on the thirty-six large private residential estates (or sometimes called “complexes”), 
which are on the “most frequently traded list” of the EPRC dataset. Data files of these 
are complete. These estates exist at the beginning of the sampling period, which 
enables us to conduct the research in a balanced panel manner. They are listed in 
Table 2a. Totally there are almost 162,000 housing units, which is roughly 15% of all 
the private sector housing by 1992. 19  The respective final completion dates, the 
number of housing units the number of buildings, are also reported. Transaction 
records are grouped on a monthly basis. Following the literature, the measurement of 
the trading volume variable is simply the total number of housing units being 
transacted for each estate in each month.20 As the trading volume series are non-
stationary over time, the present study will “detrend” the variables by taking first 
difference. It avoids the problem of spurious correlation. 
Our measure of “price” also follows a standard procedure. We use a hedonic 
pricing equation to “extract” the “quality controlled price series”. In Hong Kong, 
several contracts need to be signed throughout the house purchasing process. To avoid 
the “double counting issue”, only the data of the Agreement for Sales and Purchase 
(ASP) contract is employed.21 As table 2b and 2c show, the selected estates cover a 
wide range of price, before or after adjusted for inflation, which will enable us to 
track the heterogeneous responses to a shock among different estates. 
 
(Table 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d about here) 
 
 
Since this paper studies how the correlations among the prices of different estates 
change over time, the measurement of the price deserve some serious attention. It is 
                                                 
19 According to the official data, the total stock of private housing units is about 1.087 million by the 
end of 1991. 
20 Previous research on Hong Kong have shown that alternative measures of trading volumes produce 
very similar results for this period of time. Among others, see Leung, Lau and Leong (2002) for a 
discussion. 
21 In Hong Kong, as in many other places, several agreements need to be signed in the “transaction 
process”. The other Contracts, such as Provisional Agreement for Sales and Purchase (P-ASP) and 
Assignment (ASSGT), are also included in the EPRC data. However, only the ASP contract, which is 
sometimes referred as “the final deal”, is required to be signed by law in each transaction. Without ASP 
signing, the transaction is officially incomplete. 
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well known that a major obstacle to measure the housing price accurately is the 
intrinsic heterogeneity of housing units.22  For instance, the composition of the 
properties being traded (such as large size versus size) may change over the business 
cycle. To control for the heterogeneity, this study follow the literature and adopted the 
hedonic pricing regression approach.23 In addition, due to the unusual sample size, 
this study can afford to estimate the same hedonic pricing equation in each period, and 
thereby allowing for time-varying coefficients for different characteristics. It would 
provide a natural benchmark for us to compare the performance of the regression 
across different time periods.  
 Specifically, following the suggestion of Malpezzi (2002), a semi-log cross-
sectional hedonic pricing equation in the following form is estimated for each month: 
 ln P =βo  + β1S  + β2D  + ε 
where ln P represents the natural log of the property prices, S represents structural 
traits (including the floor level, construction area of the apartment unit, the age of the 
building24 and a dummy variable of lucky floor numbers), D represents a set of 
dummies (each one belongs to one estate)25, ε represents the error term in regression, 
and β  I , I = 0,1,2, are the vector of coefficients obtained in each period t. We 
construct a constant-quality price index for each estate. 26  And since we intend to 
compare across different time series, we convert all the prices into real terms. The 
details of the index construction and variable definitions can be found in the Appendix. 
Before the formal analysis, it is instructive to have an overview. As shown in 
figure 2a, the 2R and adjusted 2R of the hedonic pricing regression almost coincides 
each other, which suggests that there is no redundant variables on the right hand side. 
In fact, the hedonic pricing model seems to be “quite successful.” On average, this 
simple model explains about 91% of the housing price variations from 1992 M1 to 
2005 M12. However, as also shown in figure 2a, there is a level drop for the goodness 
of fit (for both the 2R and adjusted 2R ) of this model in the later part of sampling 
                                                 
22 Again, the literature is too large to be reviewed here. Among others, see Case and Quigley (1991), 
Quigley (1995), Englund, Quigley and Redfearn (1999). 
23 The literature is too large to be reviewed here. See Malpezzi (2002) for an extensive literature review. 
24 Squared and cubic terms of these three variables are also included in the equation, in order to capture 
any non-linear effect. 
25 (N -1) estate dummies will be included in the regression equation, where N is the number of estates 
that have transaction records in the period. 
26 See Berg (2004) for more details. The set of the independent variables for price calculation is chosen 
according to the mean value of housing attributes of the transactions in January 1992. 
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period (after the mid-1999). We employ the structural break test developed by 
Andrews and Ploberger (1994) and confirm that both the 2R and adjusted 
2R experience a break in August 1999.27 Also, the values of the R-square seem to 
become more volatile in the later period. We apply the structural break test again and 
for the month-to-month changes for both the 2R and adjusted 2R , the estimated break-
date is September 1999. Thus, it is about the same time that the mean 2R decreases 
and the variance of 2R increases. It may reflect a “structural change” in the housing 
market, such as a change of the market expectation.  
 
(Figure 2a about here) 
 
To further investigate the possibility of a “structural change” in the housing 
market, we follow the volatility decomposition procedure developed by Campbell, 
Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) (hereafter CLMX).28  In the context of the stock 
market, CLMX attempt to decompose the volatility of individual stocks into the 
“market volatility” and the “idiosyncratic volatility.” In a sense, this method is “model 
free.” It does not require the researchers to estimate neither the betas (covariances) for 
individual assets, nor a highly parameterized time-varying volatility models. Details 
of CLMX “model-free” return decomposition can be found in the appendix.   
In Figure 2b, we plot the time series of 24-month rolling window aggregate 
market variance (MKT), average estate-level variance (IDIO), and total variance 
(VAR) by giving equal weight on the 36 estates in our sample. Both the estate-level 
and the total variances start off relatively low and tend to rise towards the end of the 
period after the 1997 handover. The average idiosyncratic (estate-level) variance is the 
major component, contributing about 73% of the total variance for the whole sample 
period. It is especially true in later years. While the share of idiosyncratic component 
only accounts for 60% of the total variation before 2001, the same ratio jumps to 
about 92% of the post 2001 period!  As in CLMX, a higher average idiosyncratic risk 
together with unchanged level of “market risk” implies a decrease in the mean 
correlation amongst the assets (“estates” in our case) in the portfolio. It is interesting 
to notice that the total variance and the share of idiosyncratic risk in the total variance 
                                                 
27 The details are available upon request. 
28 The VOL correlation is not discussed in this section because the “fundamental” factor model is 
unsuitable to be borrowed to study the correlation between detrended trading volume. 
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move closely together. While it is premature to reach a conclusion with only figure 2a 
and 2b, they do suggest the possibility of a significant “structural change” in the 
housing market, which would be reflected in the correlation structures among 
different estates. This will be studied in much more details in the following sections. 
 
(Figure 2b about here) 
 
3. Methodology 
 
This section explains the empirical tools used in the study. Since this paper 
follows the “rolling regression approach,” two-year correlation coefficients are 
computed by rolling the sample period ahead one month at a time. Notice that these 
correlation coefficients are only sample moments and hence would change over time. 
They depend on which two-year period being selected. Thus, these correlation 
coefficients are regarded as random variables.29 They are computed for each possible 
combination of pair of estates within each window (i.e. 630 for the full sample and 
325 for the restricted sample). Clearly, this distribution of “sub-sample correlations” 
needs not be normal, or conforming to any well known cases. In fact, we will show 
that the distribution of the correlations change quite dramatically over time. It makes 
the complete tracking of the evolution of such distributions virtually impossible. To 
“summarize” the rich dynamics of the correlation distributions, we focus on the three 
moments, i.e. the mean, standard deviation and skewness of the distributions of all 
pair-wise correlation coefficients. Following the previous literature, we categorize the 
correlation coefficients into groups: (1) positive, (2) negative, (3) (statistically) 
significantly positive, (4) significantly negative for each window we estimate. The 
precise mathematical formulas are given in the appendix.30 
                                                 
29 By construction, these correlations are likely to be strongly serially correlated, which tend to make 
“structural changes” less likely. As we will see later, however, structural changes do seem to happen in 
different places.  
30 In an earlier version of this paper, the asymmetry of correlation is also analyzed. Following the 
general estimation strategy (see Drobetz and Zimmermann, 2000), for a specific pair of residential 
estates, a month is classified as an “up-up” state if both estate returns are above their own average 
(positive semi-correlation), while a “down-down” state is defined as a month where both returns are 
less than their own average (negative semi-correlation). Correlations are separately estimated for the 
two regimes. Among other things, we find that pairs of estates which have positive correlation in 
returns within a certain window also tend to have positive correlation in trading volume, which may 
suggest those estates may be “substitutes” in that particular period of time. The details are available 
upon request.  
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4. Empirical Results 
 
The empirical results are presented in the following order. First, an overview for 
the dataset will be presented. Then the rolling window technique will be used to 
compute the correlation coefficients for both detrended prices (or ROR) and trading 
volumes (VOL). It is followed by more diagnosis of the results.  
 
4.1 Overview for the trading volume and Quality-Controlled Returns  
 
Since the real housing prices are non-stationary over time, our analysis focuses 
on the returns, or the detrended housing prices, or simply prices. Table 2 has provided 
the summary statistics for the monthly, quality controlled, real rate of return for the 36 
estates. In general, the standard deviation of real rate of return is high, reflecting 
considerable investment risk in the housing market. Table 3a and 3b provide the 
summary statistics for the monthly trading volume and detrended trading volume for 
the 36 estates in the sample (number of zero transaction months is included in Table 
3a). An occasionally large number indicates there are typically primary sales for that 
estate in that month. Our restricted sample, with all the primary sales removed, 
however, produce essentially the same results. In other words, the dynamics of 
correlation structure, which is our focus of analysis, is somewhat robust to these 
outliers. For now, we will show how the correlation structure changes over time. 
 
(Table 3a and 3b about here) 
 
4.2   Rolling Window Estimation 
 
4.2.1 Count of Correlation Coefficients in Each Window 
 
Figure 3a shows how the compositions of different kinds of correlations among 
different estate detrended prices change over time. Clearly, the share of positive 
correlations (including both statistical significant and insignificant ones) is very large 
and not less than 64% throughout, which indicates the estates in the sample in general 
move in the same direction. However, there seems to be a structural break as the 
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percentage of positive correlations drops quickly since the 1999 M11. It means that 
there is a substantial difference in correlation structure between that month and 24 
months ago. Clearly, there is significant overlapping between any two consecutive 
windows, as 23 out of 24 observations are identical. Thus, a structural change in 
correlation structure, which is confirmed by formal statistical test, is not likely to be 
driven by some outliers. Even when we restrict the attention to the share of 
significantly positive correlations, the structural break can still be found.31 It started to 
drop at 1998 M6 with more dramatic speed than the share of positive correlations: it 
drops from around 90% in 1998 to just 10% in 2003. Notice also that the “speed” the 
share of positive correlations drop seems to be much faster than the increase, and 
thus the correlation structure seems to be asymmetric in a sense. On the other hand, 
although the share of negative correlations increases up to more than 20% after 2000 
M11, almost none of those negative correlations are significantly different from zero 
in the sampling period. So, the evidence suggests that the correlations among estate 
detrended prices (or, simply, prices) change from positive (i.e. co-move) to 
insignificant (i.e. un-correlated). 
 
(Figure 3a, 3b about here) 
 
Figure 3b shows the same kind of time plots for detrended trading volume in the 
full sample. As the case of detrended prices, the share of positive correlations is in 
general very large and not fewer than 67% throughout. And like the case of prices, the 
share of significantly positive correlations seems to exhibit some kind of “structural 
change” after the Asian Financial Crisis. It increases dramatically, and somehow 
persistently until the mid-1999. The share of the significantly positive correlations 
drops almost 30% in a single month! Again, the drop seems to be faster than the 
increase. On the other hand, although the share of negative correlations has increased 
up to 32% around the outbreak of SARS, most of the negative correlations are not 
significantly different from zero in the sampling period. In short, the pattern of the 
correlation structure for trading volume is very similar to that of prices.  
 
4.2.2 The Summary Statistics of Correlation Coefficients 
                                                 
31 The result is available upon request. 
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The previous analysis shows the composition change of the sample correlations. 
However, it does not give information about the magnitude of that change. Consider 
the following situation. Assume that there are 4 estates and totally 6 different pair-
wise correlations. And for the argument sake, let us say 4 of them are 0.5 and the 
other two of them are -0.9. Clearly, the share of the positive correlations is 66%. 
However, the average correlation is only 0.03 and effectively zero. Thus, on top of 
calculating the share of significantly positive correlation, it may be important to 
calculate the moments (such as the average) of the distribution of correlations. Figure 
4 provides a visualization of the mean of these real housing return correlations over 
time (solid blue line). And for comparison, we also provide the time plot of the value-
weighted average of the sample price (dotted red line).  
 
(Figure 4 about here) 
 
The average correlation clearly displays an upward trend until the series reaches 
its peak value (from about 0.3 to more than 0.7) at 1998 M6, which covers the period 
from 1996 M7 to 1998 M6. It then experiences a sharp drop. As shown in the figure, 
the decline in average correlation somewhat lags the drop of the average housing 
price. The average correlation reaches its lowest point at 2003 M4, which is about 
0.1.32 The corresponding window covers the period from 2001 M5 to 2003 M4, which 
is the time of the SARS epidemic. Later, a number of supportive policy measures 
were introduced by the China Central Government and led to a recovery of the Hong 
Kong economy, including the housing market. It is especially true for some luxurious 
estates. Interestingly, the mean correlation does not rebound with the average housing 
price.33 Clearly, the price correlations are highly non-stationary and cannot be easily 
analyzed with standard econometric tools such as VAR, VECM, which are more 
suitable for trend-stationary or first-difference-stationary type processes. Applying 
appropriate structural break tests will indicate that “breaks” do occur during the 
sampling period. Perhaps more importantly, this asymmetric relationship between the 
average correlation among different estate prices and the average housing price would 
                                                 
32 It is not surprising that there are structural breaks in these series. Results are available upon request. 
33 In fact, we can confirm statistically that a structural break occurs in this series as well. The details are 
available upon request. 
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pose a challenge to theories which attempt to explain the housing price dynamics by 
aggregate shocks alone. By the same token, the continual process of sub-urbanization 
and improvement of transportation network cannot be an explanation for this “cycle’’ 
of mean correlation among the prices of different estates. 
In the appendix, we also provide the counterpart for the standard deviation and 
the skewness. Interestingly, we find that the skewness of the distribution of 
correlations is like a mirror image of the mean correlation, with a correlation of -0.95. 
The distribution of correlations is generally negatively skewed (or called skewed to 
the left). We will have a “case study” in some later section. Now, we will turn to the 
correlation distribution for different estate trading volume.  
Interestingly, the distribution of trading volumes displays a similar pattern as the 
prices. Figure 5 shows the mean of (detrended) trading volume in the full sample 
(solid blue line). For comparison, the 25-month sample rolling total trading volume is 
also included in the graphs34. First, the mean correlation of trading volume among 
different estates increases from slightly below 0.4 (1994 M1) to its peak, which is 
about 0.7 (1999 M1). Compared to the mean correlation for prices, the mean 
correlation of trading volume is a few months late in reaching its peak. A few months 
after January 1999, however, the mean correlation of trading volume experiences a 
sharp drop. In a month, the mean correlation almost loses all the “growth” 
accumulated in 5 years! It then fluctuates and has gone down to almost 0.1. In the 
later months, the mean correlation of trading volume restores to about 0.4, which is 
about the level at the beginning of the sample.35 In the appendix, we also show the 
evolution of the standard deviation and the skewness of trading volume correlation 
distributions. And as in the case of price, the skewness of correlations among estates’ 
trading volume is strongly related to the mean counterpart, with a correlation of -0.89!  
 
(Figure 5 about here) 
 
In addition, we have also calculated the correlation between the moment in price 
correlation and the trading volume correlation. It turns out that; not only price and 
                                                 
34 Instead of plotting the series of monthly trading volume which is quite erratic throughout the sample 
period, we plot the 25-month sample rolling total trading volume. The 25-month rolling total is selected 
to keep the consistency of information set that used to compute rolling correlations of detrended 
volume. 
35 Not surprisingly, we can find statistical evidence of a structural break in this time series. 
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trading volume are correlated, 36  but also that these two-year moving-window 
correlations are also highly correlated. The correlation between mean price correlation 
and mean volume correlation is 0.87. The counterpart for standard deviation and 
skewness are 0.75 and 0.81 respectively, showing that price and volume are very 
deeply connected and it may worth the literature to further explore. 
In sum, it seems that both in price and in trading volume, the mean correlation 
continues to increase from 1994 up to around late 1998 or early 1999, and then there 
is a dramatic decline. For trading volume, it eventually restores to the beginning level. 
For price, however, it goes down and stays at a “historical low” level. And while the 
mean correlations (for both price and trading volume) increase, the skewness 
measures of the correlation distribution become significantly more negative. And as 
the mean correlations collapse, so are the skewness measures.  
 
4.2.3 Correlation Distribution in Two Selected Windows 
 
The previous sections focus on some summary statistics to describe the evolution 
of the correlation distribution in both price and trading volume. To gain more insights 
on those distributions of correlations, this section selects two polar cases and 
examines in greater details how their corresponding distributions differ. Figure 6a and 
6b show the frequency distribution of all pair wise correlations for full sample price 
(ROR) and volume (VOL) in two selected windows. They are the window with the 
highest average correlation in price (the 2 years period ends with 1998 M6) and that 
with the lowest average correlation (the 2 years period ends with 2003 M4). 
"Frequency" (or absolute frequency) in the vertical axis indicates the number of estate 
pairs while "Interval" in the horizontal axis assigns the correlation coefficients within 
the whole range of -1.00 to 1.00. It is interesting that the correlation distributions for 
price and trading volume are so similar. 
 
(Figure 6a and 6b about here) 
  
The first selected window covers the period 1996 M7 to 1998 M6, and the Asian 
financial crisis somewhat breaks out in between. Earlier in that period, there seems to 
                                                 
36 It is widely documented. Among others, see Stein (1995). 
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be a market-wide factor which drives up the property prices in different estates to the 
same direction. Later the Asian Financial Crisis began in Thailand in July 2, 1997, 
with the collapse of Thai baht. During the subsequent months, international 
speculators attacked the Hong Kong Dollar, which was pegged at 7.8 to the US dollar. 
To defend the pegged exchange rate, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority lifts up the 
interest rate, resulting in a sharp slump in the equity markets. At the same time, the 
“85,000 policy” is announced by the former Chief Executive, Mr. Chee Hwa Tung, in 
his first Policy Address on October 8, 1997. He promises to provide affordable 
housing for the general public and to achieve a 70% homeownership rate. Thus, the 
increase in the interest rate and the expected increase in supply of affordable housing 
provided a market-wide adverse effect on the asset values.37 And the housing prices in 
different estates decline together.38 As expected, this window captures the period with 
the highest mean correlation of prices. In addition, as the correlation coefficients are 
bounded above by positive one, the distribution becomes more negatively skewed.  
The second selected window covers the period 2001 M5 to 2003 M4, which is 
around the outbreak of SARS. As we can observe from Figure 6b, the distribution of 
correlation coefficients shows a lower average value, a larger standard deviation and 
an approximately symmetric shape, meaning that some of estate pairs are highly 
positively correlated while some of them are negatively correlated. There are a 
number of potential reasons for why the estates response differently to the shock 
during the outbreak of SARS. First, SARS has only a weak influence on the market-
wide factor of property price determination. The estate-specific characteristics may 
still be the dominant factor. Second, while SARS brings a general downturn of the 
economy, the spread of the virus seems to be geographically concentrated.39 Third, 
there is a sudden drop in transaction volume during April 2003 and the price measure 
may be “biased” by the “thin trading volume.”  
From the histograms, we are able to conclude that there is a coincidence of high 
average value, low standard deviation and high negative skewness in the correlation 
                                                 
37 Ironically, after the housing price collapses, Mr. Tung abandoned the “85,000 policy” in June 2000. 
Among others, see Lau (2002) for the details. 
38 Among others, see Leung and Tang (2011).  
39 For instance, out of 1755 cases in Hong Kong, Amoy Garden alone accounts for 321 of them (about 
18%). Medical staffs account for another 386 of them (about 21%). In order to prevent the spread of 
viral pneumonia, all residents in Block E of the Amoy Garden were moved by the HK government to a 
quarantine camp for ten days from 31 March 2003 to 9 April 2003.  See Siu and Wong (2004) for more 
discussion. 
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structure of residential property market, for both (detrended) price and trading volume. 
  
 
5. Further Evidence and Robustness  
 
This section attempts to provide further evidence for a “structural change” in the 
correlations among different housing submarkets of Hong Kong, in order to establish 
the robustness of the results. 
 
5.1. Volatility Decomposition and Correlation Distribution 
 
This subsection attempts to connect the moments of the correlation distributions 
calculated in earlier section to the volatility decomposition developed by Campbell et 
al (2001), and applied to the Hong Kong market (results presented in section 2). 
Figure 7 displays the relationship between correlation and volatility components by 
plotting the ratio of IDIO to VAR, together with the mean correlation among the estate 
returns40. The mean correlation behaves almost like a mirror image of the ratio of the 
average estate-level variance to the average total variance, with a correlation between 
two series is about -0.99! This confirms similar findings in the previous studies of the 
financial market (for instance, see Kearney and Potì, 2004).  The increase in the extent 
of the co-movement among different estate prices is associated with a decrease in the 
share of idiosyncratic volatility in the total volatility. Notice that the volatility 
decomposition method is developed for return but it is not clear how to apply to other 
variables, such as trading volume. On the other hand, this paper finds that the mean 
correlation series calculated from the rolling window method can capture basically the 
same phenomenon, and it can be applied to both return and trading volume. Perhaps 
future research can further explore this. 
 
(Figure 7 about here) 
 
5.2. Can the results be explained by composition change? 
 
In the previous sections, we have adopted a “non-discriminating approach” in the 
computation of the mean correlations about housing returns and trading volume, 
                                                 
40 See Kearney and Potì, (2004, 2006) for similar exercises on the European financial market. 
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meaning that we simply pool all 36 estates together in our calculation. It is possible, 
however, that those 36 estates actually come from different distributions. For instance, 
some of them may be “luxurious housing” while some are “normal housing.” It is 
possible that the correlations within the same “class” do not change during a financial 
crisis, and yet the correlations among estates from different classes change 
significantly. In other words, the mean correlation calculation may be subject to some 
form of “composition bias.” To investigate this possibility, we divide our sample into 
two groups, with the “luxurious group” consists of all estates in the Hong Kong Island, 
plus Parc Oasis and Village Gardens, and the “normal group” includes the rest of the 
estates. We find that whether we use the average total sale price as the criteria, or 
based on the previous research on Hong Kong housing market, or some subjective 
assessments in the media, we will obtain the same classification.41 In the appendix, we 
show in details how the mean correlation can be interpreted as a weighted average of 
three sub-group mean correlations, which are S1 (the mean correlation within the 
luxurious group), S2 (the mean correlation within the normal group), and S12 (the 
mean correlation among the two groups, i.e. one estate is from the luxurious group 
and the other from the normal group). We apply the same procedure as before and 
Figure 8a, 8b show respectively the subgroup mean correlations for the housing 
returns and trading volume. Interestingly, the differences among the three subgroup 
mean correlations are very minor. This suggests that our major results do not come 
from a composition change, but rather than there is an “universal change” in the 
mean correlation among estates, whether within group or between group, and whether 
it is in terms of the returns or in terms of trading volume.  
 
 (Figure 8a, 8b about here) 
 
 
5.3         A simple story for the empirical findings. 
 
The previous subsections have examined in great details of the robustness of the 
empirical results. To close this section, this subsection attempts to give a simple story 
can account for all these “stylized facts.” During the first sub-period (before the 1997), 
                                                 
41 Among others, see Leung, Wong and Cheung (2007) for more details.  
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people all have good expectation of the market. The idiosyncratic component 
becomes relatively unimportant and its share in the total variance becomes smaller. At 
the same time, since the “market factor” is the driving force, there is a high 
correlation among estates in terms of price and trading volume. The Asian financial 
crisis then brings a “regime shift” in the expectation formation. People start to 
evaluate the estates according to individual characteristics. This leads to a sharp drop 
in the correlations among estates, and also a large increase in the share of 
idiosyncratic component in the total variance.  
This “theory” is also consistent with the behavioral and experimental evidence 
presented by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). For instance, Thaler and Sunstein (2008, 
p.32) reported that in a survey of people starting new businesses, they were asked 
both the chance of success for a typical business and the counterpart of their own 
business. “The most common answers to these questions were 50 percent and 90 
percent, respectively, and many said 100 percent to the second question.’’ Thaler and 
Sunstein (2008, p.33) summarize that “Lotteries are successful partly because of 
unrealistic optimism. Unrealistic optimism is a pervasive feature of human life… if 
people are reminded of a bad event, they may not continue to be so optimistic.’’ In the 
language of Wang et al (2002), people were “over-confident” when the house price is 
increasing and turned the other way round when they see the price “collapses.”  
Notice that while this explanation differs from the finance literature in at least 
one important dimension. Among others, Ang and Chen (2002), Connolly and Wang 
(2003), Longin and Solnik (2001), find that correlations among financial markets 
increase during market downturns than upturns. Recent theoretical works such as 
Veldkamp (2006), Yuan (2005) also generate similar predictions. In this housing 
market study, however, the average correlations among estates price (trading volume) 
increase with the average property price (trading volume), which is in sharp contrast 
to the case of the financial market. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
While the media frequently used terms such as “structural change in the market,” 
“bubble burst,” etc., the academic literature has yet to reach a consensus for precise 
and operative definitions for these terms. This paper attempts to contribute to the 
literature by providing the Hong Kong experience as a concrete example of “structural 
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change in housing market.” In particular, we estimate and analyze the time-varying 
correlation structure of real rate of return among the most frequently traded estates, 
and we find that the co-movements among different sub-markets vary significantly. 
While our paper is empirical, it sheds light on several theoretical literatures. First, 
we find that in sharp contrast to the finance literature, however, the correlations 
among prices of different sub-markets are higher when the market booms. More 
specifically, the mean correlation of detrended prices increases from about 0.3 (1994 
M1) to more than 0.7 (1998 M1). The Asian financial crisis then occurs and the real 
price of housing lost about half of its value in a few months. The mean correlation 
also goes down to below 0.2 (2001 M1), even before the SARS. The situation of mean 
correlation of trading volume is qualitatively similar but quantitatively more dramatic. 
It decreases from about 0.65 (1999 M1) to below 0.4 within a year! And even when 
both the detrended price and trading volume rebound after 2004 M1, the mean 
correlations stay low. These empirical findings clearly demonstrate real estate assets 
are indeed very different from the financial assets and more theoretical works are 
needed. Furthermore, the pattern of the price correlations and volume correlations 
among different sub-markets identified in this paper may not be easily explained by 
the family of theories which merely emphasize the aggregate shock, aggregate 
financial constraints or search frictions. It should be emphasized that existing theories 
have made important contributions for our understanding of the real estate markets in 
the “normal times.” On the other hand, the “new stylized facts” provided by this paper 
focuses on the ability for those models to account for the markets in “crisis times.” 
Obviously, future research efforts should be invested on building “unifying 
framework” which can account for both the “normal times” and the “crisis times.”  
On the other hand, our finding of “structural changes in price correlations and 
volume correlations” seems to be in line with recent theories which emphasize on the 
bounded rationality of agents. For instance, in Hong, Stein and Yu (2007), agents use 
oversimplified model to make their price forecast.42 If one particular model performs 
poorly over a certain period of time, it will be replaced by another simple model, 
resulting in a “regime shift” in the forecasting. This is consistent with the Hong Kong 
experience before the Asian financial crisis, where housing investment is “always 
profitable,” and the sudden change after that. The “over-confidence” theory put forth 
                                                 
42 Clearly, it is beyond this paper to review the literature on “learning in finance”. Among others, see 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), Zhang (2006). 
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by Peng and Xiong (2006), among others, also help us to explain why the estate prices 
are so correlated and the “market factor” seems to dominate in the total variance 
before the crisis. In the context of financial market, Peng and Xiong (2006) show that 
if investors have limited attention, they tend to process more market-wide information 
than firm-specific information. If they are also overconfident, then the return 
correlations between firms can be higher than the fundamental correlations. 
Our finding about “structural change” at the micro-level of the housing market in 
Hong Kong is also consistent with the research based on aggregate data. Among 
others, Chang et al (2011) find empirical evidence that the Hong Kong asset markets 
(i.e. the stock market and housing market) are influenced by the U.S. financial market 
variables and significant regime switching have been observed. Future works should 
try to relate the evidence at the micro-level and the aggregate-level in a unifying 
framework. 
While this paper focuses on the Hong Kong experience, similar reasoning may 
also apply to other countries. For instance, Shiller (2008, p.28) states that the 
“housing bubble was a major cause, if not the cause, of the subprime crisis and of the 
broader economic crisis we now face. The perception that real estate prices could only 
go up, year after year, established an atmosphere that invited lenders and financial 
institutions to loosen their standards and risk default. Now the defaults are happening, 
massively and contagiously.” Thus, to further test the hypotheses put forth by this 
paper is to wait for the end of the subprime crisis and see if the correlations among 
housing prices in different cities, or different districts within the same cities, actually 
decrease. 
     A weakness of this research is that we did not perform a formal statistical test on 
the “structural change.” The confidence interval is the hard part. Notice that 
confidence interval is based on some assumptions of the underlying distribution. If the 
market, as a system, really experiences a structural change, then what is the 
appropriate distribution? Previous works on structural break tends to limit the 
attention to uni-variate case and the structural change of the variable to a very specific 
form and tests whether such form of break happens. Now it is a system that 
experiences a structural change, which will generate rolling-sample correlations 
among variables within the system that change from 0.35 to more than 0.7 (i.e. 
doubling). To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any work that describes 
this kind of structural change. We leave this to the future research. 
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Future research can also be extended in other directions. First, the sample can be 
enlarged. This thesis focuses on the most frequently traded list, which have 
transaction records as early as January 1992, in order to obtain the longest balance 
panel data. Future research may also extend to include the less frequently traded 
estates, or even other cities for comparison. Second, this research only focuses on the 
residential housing. Future research effort should extend to commercial real estate. 
Perhaps more importantly, a unifying framework should be built to nest both the case 
of financial assets (in which price correlation will decrease with the price) and the 
case of real estate studied here (in which price correlation will decrease with the 
price). 
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 Table 1 Summary of existing theory predictions 
 
If the submarket co-
movements are 
driven by… 
Pattern of co-movements 
among different 
submarkets 
Reason 
(a) Aggregate shock 
and collateral 
constraint alone 
Constant over time or 
fluctuates around a 
constant 
All submarkets 
face the same 
shock. 
(b) Search and 
Matching alone 
Constant over time or 
fluctuates around a 
constant 
Degrees of 
search friction in 
different 
submarkets are 
constant over 
time. 
(c) Search and 
Matching; with 
loan preference 
over some 
submarkets by 
banks after a 
financial crisis 
Changes slowly  Search and 
Matching take 
time; the 
application and 
approval of 
loans also take 
time 
(d) investors who 
use over-simplified 
models and change 
models from time to 
time 
Dramatic changes of co-
movements among 
submarkets can happen 
When al agents 
switch from one 
model to 
another, 
dramatic 
changes in the 
asset price 
process can 
happen 
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Table 2a List of Housing Estates 
Estate Name Completion Date 
No. of 
Units 
No. of 
Buildings
 
Hong Kong Island 
 
   
Beverly Hill Dec-88 683 10 
Chi Fu Fa Yuen Jun-81 4326 27 
City Garden May-86 2393 14 
Heng Fa Chuen Nov-89 6311 48 
Kornhill Jun-87 6615 32 
Lei King Wan Feb-89 2295 17 
Parkvale Dec-89 838 4 
Pokfulam Garden Dec-79 1120 6 
South Horizons Mar-95 9232 34 
Taikoo Shing May-87 12690 61 
Westlands Court Jun-85 652 4 
 
Kowloon Peninsula 
 
   
Amoy Garden Jun-87 4896 19 
Laguna City Dec-94 8071 38 
Mei Foo Sun Chuen May-78 13063 99 
Parc Oasis Mar-95 1818 32 
Sceneway Garden Apr-92 4112 17 
Telford Garden Feb-82 4065 21 
Village Gardens Sep-87 488 53 
Whampoa Garden Jan-91 10287 88 
 
The New Territories    
Allway Garden Jun-81 3418 16 
Belvedere Garden Apr-91 6016 19 
City One Shatin Oct-87 10642 52 
Fanling Centre Dec-91 2200 11 
Hong Kong Gold Coast Mar-95 2052 30 
Kingswood Villas Dec-97 15836 58 
Luk Yeung Sun Chuen May-84 3624 16 
Miami Beach Towers Nov-91 1272 6 
New Town Plaza Jul-91 792 5 
Riviera Garden Dec-89 5636 20 
Sea Crest Villa Feb-95 2221 13 
Serenity Park Dec-94 2450 15 
Sun Tuen Mun Centre Sep-90 3407 10 
Tai Hing Garden Jan-94 3647 15 
Tuen Mun Town Plaza Sep-92 1928 8 
Uptown Plaza Apr-91 1200 6 
Wonderland Villas Aug-87 1502 22 
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Table 2b The Summary Statistics for the Monthly Nominal Housing Price (per 
square feet price in current HK dollars) 
 
English Name Max Min Mean SD 
Allway Garden 2961.6 896.5 1728.3 513.7 
Amoy Garden 3836.5 1223.9 2330.4 646.4 
Belvedere Garden 3791.9 884.5 2275.6 677.9 
Beverly Hill 7400.2 944.6 4333.5 1020.5 
Chi Fu Fa Yuen 4253.0 1429.2 2688.4 699.7 
City Garden 5549.4 1644.6 3425.2 924.9 
City One Shatin 3824.5 1180.6 2436.7 642.9 
Fanling Center 4505.2 997.3 2050.3 616.8 
Heng Fa Chuen 5596.4 1894.0 3328.7 880.9 
Hong Kong Gold Coast 4380.5 808.5 2037.6 765.5 
Kingswood Villas 2943.2 879.7 1624.4 469.9 
Kornhill 5477.3 1714.2 3353.5 946.8 
Laguna City 5068.0 1378.5 2939.1 931.9 
Lei King Wan 5437.1 1787.3 3401.2 863.0 
Luk Yeung Sun Chuen 4202.8 1331.6 2526.8 670.4 
Mei Foo Sun Chuen 3851.1 1249.5 2236.3 611.3 
Miami Beach 3851.7 987.6 1942.5 611.6 
New Town Plaza 6555.5 1174.3 3790.3 1005.5 
Parc Oasis 7414.0 2468.2 4262.6 1176.5 
Parkvale 9213.6 1258.7 3344.5 990.2 
Pokfulam Garden 4654.3 1385.9 2882.9 643.1 
Riviera Garden 3854.3 1110.9 2249.6 688.6 
Sceneway Garden 5322.7 1397.7 3129.3 994.6 
Sea Crest Villa 5118.9 1081.5 2489.5 904.2 
Serenity Park 3798.9 1331.6 2415.9 672.7 
South Horizons 5048.9 1677.6 3039.9 750.0 
Sun Tuen Mun Center 2707.0 760.1 1516.6 419.8 
Tai Hing Garden 3621.1 894.9 1496.0 427.5 
Taikoo Shing 5478.9 2012.4 3437.7 876.0 
Telford Garden 4169.1 1308.1 2475.3 723.2 
Tuen Mun Town Plaza 2756.2 889.3 1588.9 416.6 
Uptown Plaza 4441.5 1264.1 2821.0 745.3 
Village Garden 8682.4 1215.6 4514.1 1271.9 
Westlands Court 5783.1 1261.7 2620.1 740.2 
Whampoa Garden 5306.9 1770.4 3207.9 939.4 
Wonderland Villas 5290.5 1010.3 3015.2 1028.0 
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Table 2c The Summary Statistics for the Monthly Real Housing Price (per square 
feet price in 1992 M1 constant HK dollars) 
 
English Name Max Min Mean SD 
Allway Garden 2961.6 896.5 1728.3 513.7 
Amoy Garden 3836.5 1223.9 2330.4 646.4 
Belvedere Garden 3791.9 884.5 2275.6 677.9 
Beverly Hill 6994.8 944.6 4330.4 1006.0 
Chi Fu Fa Yuen 4253.0 1429.2 2685.5 695.3 
City Garden 5549.4 1644.6 3425.2 924.9 
City One Shatin 3824.5 1180.6 2436.7 642.9 
Fanling Center 3270.9 997.3 2040.4 589.9 
Heng Fa Chuen 5596.4 1894.0 3331.4 884.5 
Hong Kong Gold Coast 4380.5 808.5 2024.7 758.6 
Kingswood Villas 2943.2 879.7 1624.4 469.9 
Kornhill 5477.3 1714.2 3353.5 946.8 
Laguna City 5068.0 1378.5 2939.1 931.9 
Lei King Wan 5437.1 1787.3 3401.2 863.0 
Luk Yeung Sun Chuen 4202.8 1331.6 2526.8 670.4 
Mei Foo Sun Chuen 3851.1 1249.5 2236.3 611.3 
Miami Beach 3851.7 987.6 1939.5 614.6 
New Town Plaza 6555.5 1174.3 3789.4 1013.4 
Parc Oasis 7414.0 2468.2 4262.6 1176.5 
Parkvale 5169.5 1258.7 3284.1 852.2 
Pokfulam Garden 4654.3 1385.9 2878.4 648.1 
Riviera Garden 3854.3 1110.9 2244.6 682.5 
Sceneway Garden 5322.7 1397.7 3129.3 994.6 
Sea Crest Villa 5118.9 1081.5 2474.3 892.3 
Serenity Park 3798.9 1331.6 2415.9 672.7 
South Horizons 5048.9 1677.6 3039.9 750.0 
Sun Tuen Mun Center 2707.0 760.1 1516.6 419.8 
Tai Hing Garden 2521.1 894.9 1485.9 395.9 
Taikoo Shing 5478.9 2012.4 3437.7 876.0 
Telford Garden 4169.1 1308.1 2475.3 723.2 
Tuen Mun Town Plaza 2756.2 889.3 1580.3 414.2 
Uptown Plaza 4441.5 1264.1 2817.0 741.7 
Village Garden 8682.4 2161.4 4589.5 1237.7 
Westlands Court 4117.3 1261.7 2592.9 711.8 
Whampoa Garden 5306.9 1770.4 3207.9 939.4 
Wonderland Villas 5290.5 1010.3 3024.0 1030.3 
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Table 2d The Summary Statistics for the Monthly Real Rate of Return (in 
percentage) 
 
English Name Mean Median Maximum Minimum 
Allway Garden 0.108 7.728 25.021 -21.742 
Amoy Garden -0.067 5.379 25.812 -16.366 
Belvedere Garden 0.128 7.846 62.820 -38.236 
Beverly Hill 2.211 23.303 213.753 -77.062 
Chi Fu Fa Yuen 0.118 6.679 20.011 -19.955 
City Garden 0.639 11.164 54.083 -33.735 
City One Shatin 0.018 5.568 24.759 -23.322 
Fanling Center -0.039 5.368 15.103 -18.177 
Heng Fa Chuen 0.165 5.894 23.918 -21.606 
Hong Kong Gold Coast 0.721 13.655 61.359 -35.981 
Kingswood Villas -0.148 5.113 14.001 -13.804 
Kornhill 0.113 5.640 19.303 -17.688 
Laguna City 0.140 6.939 30.542 -21.419 
Lei King Wan 0.298 7.139 29.466 -25.016 
Luk Yeung Sun Chuen 0.124 6.944 22.474 -20.275 
Mei Foo Sun Chuen 0.151 5.085 14.669 -16.324 
Miami Beach 0.162 7.938 26.083 -23.160 
New Town Plaza 0.721 12.343 98.425 -46.725 
Parc Oasis 0.536 9.340 42.755 -38.226 
Parkvale 0.955 15.986 148.188 -56.109 
Pokfulam Garden 0.954 13.869 64.133 -44.242 
Riviera Garden -0.018 6.295 28.067 -22.562 
Sceneway Garden 0.249 7.177 24.193 -25.439 
Sea Crest Villa 0.272 10.106 72.010 -27.359 
Serenity Park 0.140 6.281 30.465 -19.592 
South Horizons 0.227 5.568 12.187 -17.554 
Sun Tuen Mun Center -0.026 7.242 37.206 -19.247 
Tai Hing Garden -0.138 5.377 14.572 -15.882 
Taikoo Shing 0.212 5.409 20.556 -12.992 
Telford Garden 0.182 6.768 18.298 -19.699 
Tuen Mun Town Plaza -0.056 6.137 26.211 -22.139 
Uptown Plaza 0.564 11.755 74.489 -46.256 
Village Garden 1.947 20.520 132.262 -60.042 
Westlands Court 0.145 7.873 28.664 -30.833 
Whampoa Garden 0.021 4.681 17.193 -16.364 
Wonderland Villas 0.350 10.337 58.620 -38.896 
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Table 3a The Summary Statistics for the Monthly Trading Volume 
 
Estate Name Mean SD Max Min
No. of Zero 
Transaction 
Month 
Allway Garden 19.375 12.671 76 1 0 
Amoy Garden 38.905 23.813 128 7 0 
Belvedere Garden 40.542 28.077 175 9 0 
Beverly Hill 6.399 6.483 47 0 5 
Chi Fu Fa Yuen 25.393 16.333 82 0 1 
City Garden 15.357 9.979 62 3 0 
City One Shatin 98.839 64.157 353 21 0 
Fanling Center 18.970 14.046 74 0 1 
Heng Fa Chuen 46.601 34.539 157 0 1 
Hong Kong Gold 
Coast 10.988 16.526 149 0 2 
Kingswood Villas 174.083 232.075 1267 14 0 
Kornhill 47.548 33.625 183 7 0 
Laguna City 71.738 78.447 624 11 0 
Lei King Wan 15.821 10.628 48 2 0 
Luk Yeung Sun Chuen 22.964 14.953 69 1 0 
Mei Foo Sun Chuen 96.423 55.830 341 26 0 
Miami Beach 12.446 10.032 64 0 1 
New Town Plaza 5.327 4.418 25 0 8 
Parc Oasis 21.077 36.902 343 1 0 
Parkvale 5.131 4.110 19 0 6 
Pokfulam Garden 7.167 4.666 27 0 3 
Riviera Garden 37.280 27.428 156 0 1 
Sceneway Garden 31.792 22.283 123 5 0 
Sea Crest Villa 28.673 49.680 338 0 3 
Serenity Park 25.690 27.208 218 3 0 
South Horizons 99.899 169.510 1205 17 0 
Sun Tuen Mun Center 24.649 17.436 97 4 0 
Tai Hing Garden 36.911 67.538 693 0 1 
Taikoo Shing 86.976 55.422 298 20 0 
Telford Garden 26.304 16.094 99 7 0 
Tuen Mun Town Plaza 16.000 19.786 180 0 1 
Uptown Plaza 9.524 6.507 38 0 1 
Village Garden 4.179 3.513 20 0 9 
Westlands Court 5.607 4.460 21 0 5 
Whampoa Garden 76.185 50.801 302 10 0 
Wonderland Villas 11.155 9.246 52 0 1 
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Table 3b The Summary Statistics for the Detrended Monthly Trading Volume 
 
Estate Name MEAN SD Max Min 
Allway Garden -0.036 11.392 48 -40 
Amoy Garden -0.341 22.305 81 -96 
Belvedere Garden -0.425 25.192 126 -118 
Beverly Hill -0.072 6.793 40 -39 
Chi Fu Fa Yuen -0.078 15.602 57 -55 
City Garden -0.198 8.800 25 -44 
City One Shatin -1.072 54.586 218 -208 
Fanling Center -0.024 10.445 37 -28 
Heng Fa Chuen -0.557 27.835 98 -102 
Hong Kong Gold Coast -0.036 15.954 100 -137 
Kingswood Villas -1.222 239.866 1217 -1138 
Kornhill -0.623 28.829 105 -131 
Laguna City -1.856 93.052 578 -572 
Lei King Wan -0.036 9.312 34 -28 
Luk Yeung Sun Chuen -0.293 11.924 38 -47 
Mei Foo Sun Chuen -0.707 47.336 207 -224 
Miami Beach -0.066 9.015 40 -43 
New Town Plaza -0.084 4.047 12 -16 
Parc Oasis -0.796 49.886 325 -310 
Parkvale -0.024 3.939 13 -13 
Pokfulam Garden -0.072 4.890 17 -12 
Riviera Garden -0.431 23.531 101 -82 
Sceneway Garden -0.102 17.288 57 -57 
Sea Crest Villa 0.036 45.931 301 -274 
Serenity Park -0.060 24.557 201 -151 
South Horizons 0.066 191.036 1161 -974 
Sun Tuen Mun Center -0.180 15.259 58 -68 
Tai Hing Garden 0.060 72.845 692 -409 
Taikoo Shing -0.844 45.793 160 -190 
Telford Garden -0.275 14.784 57 -64 
Tuen Mun Town Plaza -0.036 20.158 163 -166 
Uptown Plaza -0.048 6.347 21 -25 
Village Garden 0.000 3.706 13 -16 
Westlands Court -0.102 4.716 18 -15 
Whampoa Garden -0.647 40.751 139 -200 
Wonderland Villas -0.060 7.724 23 -38 
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Figure 1a  Quarterly Housing Price Indices (Official Data; in real terms) (1999 
Q1=100) 
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Figure 1b  The Time Plots of Real Housing Price (Authors’ calculations)  
(Jan 1993 =100) 
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Figure 2a    The Time Plots of Goodness of Fit of the Hedonic Pricing 
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Figure 2b Aggregate Market Variance, Estate-Level and Total Variance - Full Sample 
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Figure 3a Count of Correlation Coefficients in Each Window for Full Sample Price 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1994M1 1995M1 1996M1 1997M1 1998M1 1999M1 2000M1 2001M1 2002M1 2003M1 2004M1 2005M1
Date
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
positive (%) negative (%) significantly positive (%) significantly negative (%)  
Figure 3b Count of Correlation Coefficients in Each Window for Full Sample VOL 
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Figure 4 Mean - Rolling Window Correlation Coefficients for Full Sample Price 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Mean - Rolling Window Correlation Coefficients for Full Sample VOL 
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Figure 6a Distributions of Correlation Coefficients During the Most Correlated and the 
Least Correlated Periods - Full Sample Price (ROR) 
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Figure 6b Distributions of Correlation Coefficients During the Most Correlated and the 
Least Correlated Periods - Full Sample VOL 
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Figure 7   Variance Ratio and Mean Correlation - Full Sample 
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Figure 8a Decomposition of the mean correlation of returns among different estates. 
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Figure 8b Decomposition of the mean correlation of trading volumes among different 
estates. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I 
 
A Summary of Hedonic Pricing Equation 
 
In our hedonic pricing models, a number of variables were used to capture both the 
within-estate and intra-estate heterogeneity.  
 
1. Within-estate Variables 
 
All housing units in our sample are selected from large housing estates typically 
consisting of high-rise residential blocks with 6-8 apartment units on each floor. The high 
homogeneity of the physical characteristics of our sample allows us to include only a few 
major structural attributes such as floor levels, flat sizes (measured in square feet)43, and 
building age (time distance between the date of completion and date of our investigation)44 to 
capture the within-estate variation. Squared and cubic terms of these three variables are also 
included in the equation, so to capture any non-linear effect. Also a dummy variable of lucky 
numbers (a flat is located on a floor with lucky numbers (i.e. 8,18,28 and 38)) is included to 
capture the possible effect of this cultural factor, which is a concern (in terms of “feng shui”) 
that may be of particular importance in the Chinese context. 
 
2. Intra-estate Variables 
 
Moreover, as the properties in our sample are estate-type housing units, they normally 
share a common set of facilities and amenities (e.g. schools and shops) within the same 
locality. As our primary goal is to investigate the time-varying correlation structure of the 
residential property market, we have to maintain the uniqueness of price dynamics of each 
estate in our sample. However, traditional approach of introducing neighborhood attribute 
variables such as swimming pools, proximity to waters, proximity to local, mass 
transportation (i.e. subway or train stations), district-level measures (i.e. Hong Kong Island, 
Kowloon Peninsula, or the New Territories) is inappropriate as some of the pairs of estates 
share exactly the same set of ‘observed’ characteristics (e.g. Village Garden and Parc Oasis). 
This necessarily implies that their returns that based on the hedonic-constructed indices will 
share the same dynamics. In order to prevent this situation, we decide to replace all these 
attributes by a set of dummy variables that each one represents one estate.  
 
In addition, we convert all nominal prices into real ones by deflating the nominal prices 
by the Consumer Price Index (A) (Year 1992=1). 
 
The ‘outlier’ problem can be troublesome in all real estate market studies. There are 
quite a number of transactions that house prices that seems to be far away from expected, 
                                                 
43 The EPRC provides two numbers of area data: the gross area and the net area. In this study we have picked 
the gross area. The first reason is that information on the net area is not always available. The second reason is 
that we want to avoid the potential source of measurement error in the sample. In Hong Kong, there is neither 
official regulation nor professional consensus about how to measure the net area. Consequently, the “net area” 
reported by property developers is subject to personal bias and varies between developers.  
44 This specification will make the index construction procedure, which based on the parameters of hedonic 
pricing models, more efficient. 
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with respect to the recorded attributes of the housing units. However, casual exclusion of the 
potential outliers could be risky in creating biases in index construction, if we eliminate too 
many observations. Huge amount of effort has to be made to check or correct every 
suspicious case and to avoid incorrect exclusion and this will not be feasible when we handle 
a huge dataset. As a result, we decide to adopt a relatively operational approach, i.e. removing 
those transaction records with real per-square-feet price lower than $100 in the stage of 
estimating the hedonic pricing model. 
 
For luxurious estates, it is almost unavoidable that there are a number of months which 
do not any transaction, as their market is relatively thin. Following the practice of past studies, 
the price of the zero-transaction month is set equal to the transaction price of previous month. 
This treatment is intuitive because the real rate of return is perceived to be zero when there is 
no transaction record during the month. In addition, as the residential property prices are non-
stationary over time, the present study employs the (realized) rate of return, which is defined 
as the monthly percentage change of real price. This can sometimes be regarded as the 
detrended property price (See Leung, Lau and Leong (2002)). In addition, this practice can 
also help to eliminate the possible scale effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix II 
 
Details Results regarding the Trading Volume 
 
As we circulate our paper, many have shown concerns about the results on the trading 
volume. To ease those concerns, we show the detailed results on the trading volume here. 
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Stationarity of Trading volume 
 
Estate  Is TV stationary?  Is the first difference of TV stationary? 
HK Island 
Beverly Hill  No  Yes 
Chi Fu Fa Yuen  No  Yes 
City Garden  No  Yes 
Heng Fa Chuen  No Yes 
Kornhill  No  Yes 
Lei King Wan  No  Yes 
Parkvale  No  Yes 
Pokfulam Garden  No Yes 
South Horizons  No  Yes 
Taikoo Shing  No  Yes 
Westlands Court  No  Yes 
 
Kowloon Peninsula     
Amoy Garden  No  Yes 
Laguna City  No  Yes 
Mei Foo Sun Chuen  No Yes 
Parc Oasis  No  Yes 
Sceneway Garden  No  Yes 
Telford Garden  No  Yes 
Village Gardens  No Yes 
Whampoa Garden  No Yes 
     
New Territories     
Allway Garden  No Yes 
Belvedere Garden  No Yes 
City One Shatin  No  Yes 
Fanling Centre  No  Yes 
Hong Kong Gold Coast  No  Yes 
Kingswood Villas  No Yes 
Luk Yeung Sun Chuen  Yes  Yes 
Miami Beach Towers  No  Yes 
New Town Plaza  No  Yes 
Riviera Garden  No Yes 
Sea Crest Villa  Yes  Yes 
Serenity Park  No  Yes 
Sun Tuen Mun Centre  No  Yes 
Tai Hing Garden  Yes Yes 
Tuen Mun Town Plaza  No  Yes 
Uptown Plaza  No  Yes 
Wonderland Villas  No  Yes 
  
 
Note: ADF test is used to check the stationarity of trading volume at 5% significance level 
(with lag = 12). Its form is: 
∆Yt = α + βT + δYt-1 + γi ∑∆Yt-i +ut 
The null hypothesis is that δ = 0, in which a unit root exists in the time series of Y. If the t-
statistics is greater than the ADF critical value, we cannot reject the null, which implies Y is 
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not stationary. 
 
Our impression is that, for several estates, the “non-stationarity” comes from a few months of 
un-usually high trading activities. That will be the case for Hong Kong Gold Coast, Sea Creat 
Villa, Tai Hing Garden, Tuen Mun Town Plaza, etc. In some other estates, they simply have 
more trading activities before 1997. Once we take the first difference, these  differences are 
harmonized and hence become stationary. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix III  
 
A Summary of Calculating Correlation Coefficient 
 
Statisticians measure and describe the degree of linear dependence between events (or 
variables), or how closely they co-vary, by means of a statistic called the correlation 
coefficient. A correlation coefficient can have a value from -1 to 1. A correlation coefficient 
of 1 (-1) means that there is a perfect positive (negative) linear relationship between the two 
variables. A correlation coefficient of 0 means that there is no linear relationship between the 
variables. 
 
A correlation coefficient describes only the overall (or average) degree of linkage 
between two events in a static way. This measure does not reveal whether the degree of 
linkage remains stable over time, or whether linkages change under extreme or unusual 
conditions. And so, the two following techniques try to add the time-varying property into 
this commonly used statistic. 
 
1. Rolling Window Estimation 
 
Let xi be the realized value of real rate of return (or detrended trading volume) for 
residential estate x on month i, at a backward-looking window (length = 24 months) in time t 
(this date refers to end of 24-month window), 
Sample Mean 


23
0i
itt xx   
Sample Variance )124/()( 2
23
0
2  


i
titx xxS  
Sample Covariance )124/())((
23
0
2  

 tit
i
titxy yyxxS  
Sample Correlation )/( yxxyxy SSSC   
The count of correlation coefficients that are (1) positive, (2) negative, (3) significantly 
positive and (4) significantly negative; the summary statistics (including mean, standard 
deviation and skewness) and the frequency distribution will be based on the estimated sample 
correlation (C xy) of 630 (325 for restricted sample) (i.e. N(N-1)/2 ) pairs of residential 
estates.  
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Appendix IV  
 
CLMX Variance Decomposition 
 
Here we present the CLMX (2001) “model-free” return decomposition that applicable 
in our study for Hong Kong residential property market. In a standard single-factor CAPM 
framework with a zero risk-free rate, estate i’s excess return in period t can be expressed as: 
(1)        itmtimit RR  ~  
where im  is estate i’s sensitivity to the market return ( mtR ) and it~  is the portion of the 
return that is uncorrelated with the market portfolio (i.e., orthogonal to mtR  by construction). 
The variance of equation (1) divides the total risk of estate i into market and estate-specific 
component. 
(2)     )~()()( 2 itmtimit VarRVarRVar    
Decomposing the variance in such ways will require us to estimate estate sensitivities 
to the whole market ( im ). CLMX variance decomposition is a clever method that gets 
around the necessity to estimate the beta coefficients by imposing the assumption of unit 
market betas (i.e. 1im  for all i). In this way, we can just focus on the weighted average 
variance across residential estates. In this simplified framework, the return for estate i is 
expressed as: 
(3)       itmtit RR   
Substituting in for itR  from equation (1) and solving for the estate-specific residual it  yields: 
(4)      itmtimit R  ~)1(   
Noting that )()1(),~)1((),( mtimmtitmtimmtit RVarRRCovRCov   , the variance of itR  
in (3) may be expressed as: 
(5)    ),(2)()()( itmtitmtit RCovVarRVarRVar    
)()1(2)()( mtimitmt RVarVarRVar    
which reintroduces the beta coefficients into the simplified variance equation.  As mentioned 
by CLMX, since the weighted average of all betas equals one, taking the weighted average 
across all estates will make the last term on the right-hand-side collapse to zero. Finally, it 
yields a beta-free decomposition of average estate volatility45: 
(6)             )()()( it
i
itmtit
i
it VarwRVarRVarw    
where itw  is estate i’s market weight at time t.  
For simplicity and easier interpretation (because throughout the paper, the market 
ROR correlation is taken to be a simple average of all pair wise correlation coefficients), we 
assume that we have an equally-weighted market portfolio, i.e. nwit /1 , where n is the 
number of residential estates in the portfolio46. And consequently the left-hand-side will be 
the average total volatility (hereafter VAR) and the right-hand-side will consist of two 
components: the market volatility (hereafter MKT) and the average estate-specific volatility 
                                                 
45 This decomposition is only an approximation as pointed out by CLMX (2001) because the average estate-
specific volatility (IDIO) is only approximately equal to the average variance of the CAPM idiosyncratic 
residuals. Their difference, however, is shown to be negligible if the cross-sectional variance of the beta 
coefficients is not too volatile. 
46 Again, n=36 in full sample while n=26 in restricted sample. 
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(hereafter IDIO).  The final form is: 
(7)                     
i
itmt
i
it Varn
RVarRVar
n
)(1)()(1   
VARt = MKTt + IDIOt 
 
 
 
Appendix V  
 
Further Results on the distribution of (sample) correlations 
 
 
In the main text, we focus on the evolution of the mean of the correlation distribution. In 
fact, the evolution of the higher moments of the correlation distribution is also interesting. 
While the standard deviation is weakly negatively correlated to the average correlation (their 
correlation is -0.37),47 the skewness of the distribution of correlations is like a mirror image 
of the mean correlation, with a correlation of -0.95! It further reinforces the idea that there 
may be a structural change in the distribution of correlation coefficients. The distribution of 
correlations is generally negatively skewed (or called skewed to the left). Numerically 
speaking, the skewness “increases” from about -0.3 to more than -1 a few months before 
1999 M1. It then declines and becomes close to zero since 2001 (i.e. the distribution becomes 
approximately symmetric). The following graphs provide a visualization of these discussions.  
 
Figure A2-1   Standard Deviation - Rolling Window Correlation Coefficients for Full 
Sample Price 
 
                                                 
47 Details of all the correlations calculations are available upon request. 
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Figure A2-2   Skewness - Rolling Window Correlation Coefficients for Full Sample Price 
 
In the text, we focused on the mean correlation of trading volume. Now we show the 
standard deviation and the skewness of trading volume correlation distributions. The standard 
deviation is (weakly) negatively correlated to the mean correlation among estates (with a 
correlation of -0.37), the skewness of trading volume correlations displays more dramatic 
movements. It starts with a value about -0.25, and reaches its numerical peak to about -1.8 in 
early 1999. In a few months, however, it sharply declines to about -0.5 and fluctuates since 
then. At the end of our sample, it almost restores to the value of -0.25, where the skewness 
series begins. And as in the case of price, the skewness of correlations among estates’ trading 
volume is strongly related to the mean counterpart, with a correlation of -0.89! The following 
figures provide visualization. 
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Figure A2-3 Standard Deviation - Rolling Window Correlation Coefficients for Full  
                        Sample VOL 
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Figure A2-4 Skewness - Rolling Window Correlation Coefficients for Full Sample 
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In the main text, we focus on how the ratio of IDIO to VAR is related to the mean 
correlation. Here we attempt to cast further light on the relationship between the higher 
moments of all pair wise correlation (i.e. standard deviation and skewness) and the ratio of 
IDIO to VAR. Standard deviation co-move with the ratio of IDIO to VAR until the end of 
2000. On the other hand, the skewness measure of correlation coefficients moves closely with 
IDIO/VAR throughout the sample period. The correlation coefficient is 0.91. The increase in 
the skewness of the correlation distribution among different estate prices is associated with an 
increase in the share of idiosyncratic volatility in the total volatility. The following figures 
provide visualization. 
 
Figure A2-5 Variance Ratio and Standard Deviation of Correlations - Full Sample 
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Figure A2-6   Variance Ratio and Skewness of Correlations - Full Sample 
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Appendix VI  
 
Decomposition of the mean correlations 
 
This section provides the details of the decomposition of the mean correlations. 
First, we fix a particular window. Assume that there are n different estates and 
there are totally N different correlations (with all the “own correlations” 
removed), then, by definition, the Mean of correlation  
 
= N
n
i
n
jij
ji /
1 ,1
, 
 
 , where ji ,  represents the correlation between estate i and j. Now 
let us focus on the sum of all correlations,  
 

n
i
n
jij
jiS
1 ,1
, , as N is simply a 
constant.  
Notice that we can rewrite S  as 
 
 

n
i
n
jij
jiS
1 ,1
, = 
1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2
, , , ,
, ,
( )i j i j j i i j
i G j G i j i G j G i G j G i G j G i j
   
         
        , where 
,2,1, iGi represent different groups of estates, which are mutually exclusive. 
Thus, the last expression simply means that we can express S  as the sum of 
three quantities. The first term is the total correlations among estate pairs where 
both estates come from group 1, while the third is the total correlations among 
estate pairs where both estates come from group 2. The second term is the total 
correlations among estate pairs where one estate is from group 1 and the other is 
from group 2.   
To give an example, let us assume that there are totally 6 estates A, B, C, D, E 
and F. Let us assume further that estate A, B and C belong to group 1 and estate 
D, E and F belong to group 2. In this case, we can write  
S  = 
1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2
, , , ,
, ,
( )i j i j j i i j
i G j G i j i G j G i G j G i G j G i j
   
         
         
= 2*{( CACBBA ,,,   ) + ( GAFAEA ,,,   + GBFBEB ,,,   + GCFCEC ,,,   ) 
+ ( GFGEFE ,,,   )}, 
where the first bracket is the sum of all correlations among estate pairs where 
both estates come from group 1, the second bracket is the total correlations 
among estate pairs where one estate is from group 1 and the other is from group 
2, and the third is the total correlations among estate pairs where both estates 
come from group 2. Notice that there is a factor “2” in both the first and the 
third term because ,..., ,,,, BCCBABBA    etc. 
In general if there are 1n estates in group 1, and 2n estates in group 2, then there 
are totally )1( 111  nnN correlations in the first term, )1( 222  nnN correlations 
in the third term, 2112 nnN  correlations in the second term. Thus, the term 
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 
 

1 1
1
,
,1 /
Gi jiGj
ji NS  measures the mean correlation among the estates within group 
1, the term  
 

2 2
2
,
,2 /
Gi jiGj
ji NS  measures the mean correlation among the estates 
within group 2, and the term 12,12 /
1 2
NS
Gi Gj
ji
 
   measures the mean correlation 
among estate pairs where one estate is from group1 and the other is from group 
2.  
Now assume that we calculate 1S , 2S , 12S  for each window. As we roll over 
different windows, we can trace the changes of the mean correlations within 
group as well as among groups. 
 
 
 
